Last month, Somerset County Superior Court Judge William G. Mennen IV issued two decisions that drew attention across New Jersey’s election law community. In separate hearings, Judge Mennen permitted two unregistered people to vote in the November general election—despite their failure to satisfy the statutory requirements for voter registration.
His rationale was simple but profound: the right to vote is “a sacred right … afforded every United States citizen,” and the judiciary should “do everything in its power to facilitate those who wish to vote.”
These cases, though fact-specific, raise a much broader question about equal treatment and constitutional fairness: what happens when one trial-level judge in one county allows a voter to cast a ballot under such circumstances, but another judge elsewhere denies that same right to someone similarly situated? Does the resulting inconsistency itself violate due process and equal protection?
The Cases Before Judge Mennen
The first case involved a 20-year-old Hunterdon County resident who believed that registering for the Selective Service simultaneously registered him to vote. He appeared at his polling place only to discover that his name was missing from the rolls. In the second case, a Somerset County man acknowledged he had no memory of ever registering, but he sought to do so immediately so that he could participate in the approaching election.
In both instances, Judge Mennen found that the applicants acted in good faith and that their desire to participate in the democratic process should not be thwarted by technical mistakes or misunderstandings. Rather than applying the voter registration statute narrowly, he construed New Jersey’s election laws liberally to protect the fundamental right to vote. Each man’s name was ordered added to the voter rolls, and each was permitted to cast a ballot.
The decision reflects an expansive view of judicial authority to safeguard voting rights, particularly where a citizen demonstrates honest intent and minimal fault. It aligns with the long-standing New Jersey policy that election statutes should be construed to enfranchise rather than disenfranchise.
The Uneven Application of a Fundamental Right
Yet Judge Mennen’s reasoning also exposes a structural vulnerability in the state’s election framework. Because these rulings are not binding outside Somerset County, a similarly situated voter in neighboring counties—say, Middlesex or Bergen—might encounter a very different outcome. Another Superior Court judge could read the same statutes more narrowly and deny relief, holding that registration deadlines and statutory formalities are mandatory. The same fact pattern could yield diametrically opposite results depending solely on geography.
That variability poses a problem far deeper than administrative inconvenience. Voting is not merely a statutory privilege—it is a constitutional right protected by both the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When the state, acting through its judiciary, applies fundamentally different standards to determine who may exercise that right, it risks violating the basic guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The Due Process Argument
Due process, at its core, ensures that government action is not arbitrary and that similarly situated individuals are treated with consistency and fairness. While courts often invoke equal protection to address discriminatory classifications, procedural and substantive due process doctrines also require that state action, especially concerning a fundamental right, follow rational, predictable, and even-handed principles.
When a New Jersey citizen’s right to vote hinges on which county courthouse he enters, the process itself becomes arbitrary. A voter in Somerset County may be enfranchised because Judge Mennen favors liberal interpretation; a voter in Sussex County may be disenfranchised because another judge insists on literal statutory compliance. The absence of a uniform statewide standard means that the government’s treatment of citizens differs not because of their conduct, but because of the happenstance of venue.
This inconsistency undermines public confidence in the electoral system and violates the notion of “ordered liberty” that due process protects. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that once a state grants the right to vote, it cannot administer that right in a fundamentally unfair or uneven manner. Bush v. Gore (2000) is the modern reminder: even within a single state, varying standards for counting or validating votes can run afoul of constitutional guarantees. The same logic applies to judicial gatekeeping of ballot access before an election occurs.
Substantive and Procedural Dimensions
From a procedural standpoint, due process demands notice, an opportunity to be heard, and consistent rules applied to similar situations. New Jersey provides administrative and judicial remedies for voter registration disputes, but those remedies lose legitimacy if their outcomes depend on individual judges’ philosophies rather than uniform principles. A process that grants or withholds the franchise unpredictably cannot be deemed “due.”
From a substantive standpoint, due process limits arbitrary state action that infringes on fundamental rights. The right to vote is the foundation of all other political rights; the Supreme Court has described it as “preservative of all rights.” Thus, when two citizens make the same good-faith mistake but only one is permitted to vote because of judicial happenstance, the state has engaged in arbitrary discrimination that offends substantive due process.
The Path Toward Uniformity
To remedy this disparity, New Jersey could adopt clearer statewide guidance through either legislation or administrative rulemaking. The Secretary of State and the Division of Elections could promulgate a directive establishing a uniform standard for late or defective registrations made in good faith. Alternatively, the Appellate Division could consolidate such cases and issue a precedential ruling harmonizing the approach statewide.
Absent such uniformity, county-level rulings like Judge Mennen’s will continue to produce a patchwork of access and denial. Voters will face unequal treatment, and each election cycle will risk renewed litigation. The broader constitutional lesson is that even benevolent judicial discretion intended to expand participation can create new inequities if not guided by consistent statewide principles.
Conclusion
Judge Mennen’s decisions in Somerset County underscore New Jersey’s proud tradition of protecting the right to vote. His rulings reflect compassion and a commitment to democratic inclusion. But they also reveal a tension between local discretion and constitutional uniformity. When one judge’s expansive interpretation grants the ballot and another’s narrow reading denies it, the resulting inconsistency implicates the very fairness that due process exists to secure.
Equal protection and due process converge on the same fundamental promise: that the state must treat every citizen’s vote—and every citizen’s effort to vote—with equal respect. Until that promise is fulfilled through uniform statewide standards, the sacred right Judge Mennen sought to protect will remain, for some New Jersey voters, a matter of judicial geography rather than constitutional guarantee.
Note: This article is for informational and entertainment purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. If you have questions about voter registration or eligibility, consult a licensed attorney or your county Board of Elections.
